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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to
this Court's ruling in New YorkGaslight Co. v. Carey, 447 U.S.
54 (1980), and the holdings of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits,
that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII
cases brought solely to obtain attorney's fees and costs by
plaintiffs who have prevailed in administrative proceedings?
ii
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are set forth in the
caption. Kelly Jean Chris is a pseudonym assigned to Petitioner
by Respondent Central Intelligence Agency for the purposes of
this litigation. Petitioner's real name cannot be used because
she has a covert assignment.
iii
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Kelly Jean Chris respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit is reported at 221 F.3 d
648 (2000) and is set forth in the Appendix ("App._") at A1-
AI6. The opinion of the district court is reported at 57 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (E.D. Va. 1999) and is reproduced in the
Appendix at A17-A38. The district court's orders are not
reported and are reproduced in the Appendix at A39-A41.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit was entered on July
27, 2000. By order entered on October 10, 2000, the Chief
Justice extended petitioner's time to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari to and including November 24, 2000. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 706(0(3 ) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, provides,
in pertinent part:
Each United States district court.., shall
have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
2Section 706(k) of the Act provides:
In any action or proceeding under this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal
Employment Opportunity] Commission or the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees) as part of the costs, and
the Commission and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person."
lid. § 2000e-5(k).
Section 717(c) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
Within 90 days of the receipt of notice of
final action taken by a department, agency, or
unit . or by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a
decision or order of such department, agency or
unit..., an employee.., if aggrieved by the
final disposition of his complaint.., may file a
civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of
this title .... ld. § 2000e-16(c).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Petitioner Kelly Jean Chris has been employed as a
secretary by Respondent Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA" or
"agency") since 1987. Beginning in 1993, Chris filed a number
of complaints against the agency alleging sex discrimination.
These complaints were an outgrowth of the agency's decision
to deny Chris an overseas assignment. The agency's Overseas
Candidate Review Board concluded that Chris was "too
attractive" for the location, that she was too "head strong and
strong willed," and hence temperamentally unsuited for the
appointment, and that the agency had previously experienced a
problem with a female employee at that post. At the time Chris
was denied the appointment, the agency placed in her personnel
file a letter criticizing Chris for maintaining an unapproved
relationship with a foreign national at a previous overseas post,
even though male employees who had had similar relationships
had not been sanctioned.
Title VII erects significant exhaustion requirements as
prerequisites to filing suit. As a federal employee claiming sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII, Chris was obligated first
to submit her dispute to informal conciliation and then to file a
formal complaint with the CIA, participate in the agency's
investigation, and await its decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c);
29 C.F.K. §§ 16t4.105, 1614.106(a); 1614.108 (2000); see
generally Westv. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999). These
steps are preconditions either to submitting an appeal of the
agency's decision to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") or to filing suit in
district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). If an employee decides
to pursue her claim before the EEOC, she retains the right to file
suit in district court if she is "aggrieved" by the EEOC's final
decision, or if she is dissatisfied with the pace of the EEOC's
proceeding. Id.
These administrative steps are daunting to federal
employees because agency and EEOC proceedings are formal,
adversarial, hard-fought, and time-intensive, often taking years
to resolve. Chris determined that she needed counsel to help her
navigate this process. Like most employees in Chris' position,
she could not afford to pay a lawyer on a fee-for-service basis.
Chris was able to retain counsel based in Washington, D.C.
4(where the EEOC has its offices) on a contingency fee basis, but
had to pay f9r the costs of the litigation, including the cost of
hiring a private investigator to track down the former CIA agent
who made the comment that Chris's appointment to an overseas
post had been denied because she was too attractive.
2. Chris filed her initial administrative complaint with
the CIA in September 1993. In March 1994, the agency's
Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office issued a report
finding no discrimination. Chris appealed to the EEOC.
Meanwhile, the CIA's Inspector General launched a criminal
investigation into the circumstances surrounding Chris's prior
unapproved relationship with a foreign national. Because Chris
believed that the investigation was commenced in retaliation for
her initial discrimination complaint, she filed a second
administrative complaint with the agency in July 1994. The
agency's EEO office rejected Chris's retaliation charge in March
1995. Chris then appealed that decision to the EEOC.
While her appeals were pending, Chris continued to
gather evidence to support her discrimination claim. Chris's
private investigator located the retired CIA agent who allegedly
had said that Chris had been rejected because she was too
attractive, but the agent denied making that statement.
However, during the deposition of the CIA's EEO counselor --
the agency official charged with investigating Chris's claims --
the counselor admitted that the agent had, in fact, made the
disputed statement. Following the deposition, the agency
agreed to settle both of Chris's complaints on terms favorable
to Chris, but the question of fees and costs was reserved for
further proceedings. The CIA conceded that Chris was a
"prevailing party" within the meaning of Title VII and that it
therefore was liable for Chris's attorney's fees for work before
both the agency and the EEOC. The parties, however, could
5not reach an agreement on the amount of costs and fees to be
paid. Chris's attorney submitted to the agency a fee petition
based on the then-current "Laffey" rates, a detailed account of
her hours, an affidavit attesting to her experience and billing
practices, and an itemized list of the costs incurred. _ The total
amount of costs and fees requested was approximately $80,000.
The CIA, in contrast, offered approximately $50,000, based on
a below market rate for plaintiff's counsel.
Chris appealed to the EEOC, which awarded
approximately $60,000. Most of the $20,000 differential
between Chris's request and the EEOC's award was attributable
to the EEOC's refusal to use counsel's full Laffey rate in
calculating her fee, although the Commission also disallowed
some of counsel's hours and refused to award the full cost of
hiring an investigator. Both Chris and the CIA sought
reconsideration. In an amended order, the EEOC reaffirmed its
decision to award counsel below market rates and reduced the
fee award by another $3,000. The order also informed Chris of
her fight to petition the EEOC for enforcement should the CIA
fail to make payment, and her right to "file a civil action on the
The "Laffey" rates are based on prevailing market rates
for attorneys in the District of Columbia, given their years of
experience. The approach was set out initially in Laffey v.
NorthwestAirlines, 746 F.2d 4, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and has
been carried forward by the Civil Division of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. Each year that
office adjusts the rates to account for inflation, and generally
those rates are used to determine attorney's fee awards in the
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Covington v. District of
Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Blackman v.
District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1999).
6underlying complaint... It is the position of the Commission
that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate
United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this
decision." (Capitalization and underlining in original).
3. Chris filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia against the CIA seeking an award of
reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with her EEO
complaints. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(c) and (d). On the CIA's motion, the case was
transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, and the CIA then filed a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Chris' complaint. The
district court granted the agency's motion, 57 F. Supp. 2d 330
(App. A17), concluding that Title VIl'sjurisdictional provision,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), covered only cases seeking to
enforce what the court described as the "substantive rights
guaranteed" by the Act but did not extend to cases seeking
attorney's fees alone. 2
2During the settlement negotiations involving her first
two EEO complaints, Chris learned that she was still being
shortchanged in assignments. She therefore filed a third
complaint with the agency in February 1995. That claim was
settled in September 1996, again with the understanding that
the attorney's fee issue would be litigated. The CIA did not
dispute the number of hours Chris's counsel expended on the
third complaint, but it again refused to base a fee award on
Laffey market rates. Chris appealed the ruling to the EEOC,
(continued...)
7The Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling that federal district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over actions filed under
Title VII that seek only attorney's fees and costs. 221 F.3d 648
(2000). The court reasoned that the jurisdictional grant set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) -- which speaks of "actions
brought under this subchapter" -- refers only to complaints "to
remedy an unlawfid employment practice, rather than
[complaints that] contain only a single claim for attorney's fees
and costs." ld. at 652 (App. A9). In so ruling, the court
recognized that New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447
U.S. 54 (1980), held that district courts have jurisdiction to
entertain Title VII complaints by plaintiffs who have prevailed
in administrative proceedings and are seeking attorney's fees
and costs only. Nonetheless, the court found Carey inapposite,
both because the plaintiff in Carey initially sought merits relief
in federal court in addition to her claim for attorney's fees, 221
F.3d at 654 (App. A12), and because this Court's intervening
decision in North Carolina Dep 't of Transp. v. Crest St.
Community Council Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986), found that the
"policy concerns noted in the Carey decision... [were] 'dicta'
and 'exaggerated.'" ld.
2(... continued)
which, in July 1999, awarded Chris's counsel about $2,000 in
fees, also based on below market rates. Shortly after the district
court dismissed her first action, Chris filed a second complaint
seeking fees for the legal work conducted in resolving her third
administrative complaint. By amended order dated September
15, 1999 (App. A40), the district court dismissed this action for
the reasons given in its prior opinion. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit consolidated Chris's separate appeals from the district
court's orders and affirmed.
8The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its ruling was in
conflict with Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 498
(8th Cir. 1988), which post-dated Crest Street by two years.
Jones held that Carey dictated the conclusion that Title VII
confers jurisdiction on district courts to entertain claims for
attorney's fees where the plaintiff had prevailed in an
administrative proceeding. But the Fourth Circuit "declined to
follow the Eighth Circuit's holding in Jones" because its
reasoning was "unpersuasive" and because the Eighth Circuit
erred by looking to Carey instead of Crest Street for guidance.
221 F.3d at 655 (App. A15).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Review by this Court is warranted in this case for three
related reasons. First, the decision below upsets the
understanding that has existed at least since New York Gaslight
Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), that Title VII's
jurisdictional provision authorizes suits for fees and costs where
the plaintiffhas prevailed in administrative proceedings. As this
Court emphasized in Carey, because "it is clear that Congress
intended to authorize fee awards for work done in
administrative proceedings, we must conclude that... [Title
VII's] authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses
a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees." 447 U.S. at
66. Not only does the Fourth Circuit's decision disregard
Carey's holding, it also breaks ranks with the rulings of other
circuits. Relying on Carey, lower federal courts have, until
now, consistently held that district courts have jurisdiction over
Title VII fee-only cases. Moreover, in cases arising under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), which
contains a fee provision modeled on Title VII's, the courts have
also unanimously followed Carey and not CrestStreet in holding
9that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases brought solely to
obtain fees. Accordingly, review is warranted because the
Fourth Circuit's decision is contrary to Carey, in conflict with
the decisions of other circuits, and irreconcilable with the case
law interpreting virtually identical language in the IDEA.
Second, the ruling below merits review because it
encourages Title VII complainants to by-pass administrative
remedies and proceed to court, contrary to Congress' goal in
the Act. The ruling does so by denigrating the pivotal role the
attorney's fee provision in Title VII plays in the enforcement of
the Civil Rights Act. The crux of the Fourth Circuit's holding
-- that Title VIFs attorney's fee provision is not part and parcel
of the substantive guarantees of the Act -- cannot be reconciled
with this Court's ruling in Carey, with this Court's decisions
applying Title VII, with the structure and design of Title VII, or
with the historic understanding of the role fee-shifting provisions
play in the enforcement of important federal policies. It is
crucial to understand that the Fourth Circuit's ruling that district
courts may not entertain fee-only cases has no logical stopping
point: The court's rationale applies to all Title VII litigants, not
just federal employees, and it would apply with equal force if
Petitioner's counsel bad been denied a fee altogether. The only
way a Title VII litigant could avoid the risk of the Fourth
Circuit's ruling would be to abandon the administrative process
as soon as possible and head to court. The remedial purposes
of Title VII would be ill-served by such a cramped and illogical
construction of its jurisdictional provision, and the Fourth
Circuit's new limitation on Title VII's jurisdictional reach
warrants review by this Court.
Third, the Fourth Circuit's holding will especially
frustrate Congress' effort to encourage federal employees to
pursue their Title VII claims before the EEOC rather than in
10
federal court. This concern cannot be overstated. Every year,
federal employees file over 25,000 discrimination claims with
their agencies, and over 8,000 of these claims end up before the
EEOC. EEOC, Federal Sector Report on EEO Complaints
Processing and Appeals Fiscal Year 1998 (Office of Federal
Operations, Federal Sector Programs), at 19, 61 (1999)
(hereinafter "EEOCFederal Sector Report"). The ruling below
gives federal employees a Hobson's choice --they may either
forfeit their right to seek EEOC review and go to court, or
remain before the EEOC and risk under-compensation -- a
choice that will lead many to forego EEOC review. The
resulting shift of cases away from the EEOC and into federal
court may be as dramatic as it is unfortunate, and is plainly at
odds with congressional intent.
A. The Fourth Circuit's Ruling Conflicts With Carey
And Decisions From Other Circuits.
This Court should grant review because the decision
below is contrary to this Court's holding in Carey and is in
direct conflict with the rulings of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.
The analytical starting point must be Carey, which is the Court's
only opinion addressing whether Title VII confers jurisdiction in
fee-only cases. There, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the
EEOC alleging that the New York Gaslight Club had denied her
employment because of her race. 447 U.S. at 57. As Title VII
requires, the EEOC referred Carey's complaint to the New
York Division on Human Rights, which found that the Club had
discriminated against Carey and that she was entitled to back
pay and employment; attorney's fees were not awarded because
the state agency was not empowered to make such an award.
ld. at 58. While the Club pursued an appeal in state court, the
EEOC began its proceeding. Based mainly on the state's
finding, it too found probable cause and issued Carey a right to
11
sue letter. Id. Carey then filed suit in federal court under Title
VII, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Id
Before the parties moved ahead in the federal court action, the
Club's state court appeal was rejected, and it agreed to comply
with the Division's order. Thus, the only question remaining
before the district court was Carey's request for attorney's fees
for the time spent litigating the case before the state and federal
agencies. Id at 59. The district court denied the request, but
a divided panel oftha Second Circuit reversed. Id. at 59-60.
This Court affwmed. The Court's opinion first examined
Title VII's attorney's fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),
which provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any action or
proceeding" under Title VII, "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party.., a reasonable attorney's fee." 447
U.S. at 60. The Court then held that the "broadly inclusive"
term "action or proceeding" leads to the "inescapable"
conclusion that "fees are authorized for work done at the state
and local levels," as well as in court. Id at 60-61. This reading
of the Act, the Court observed, was fortified by the remedial
purposes of Title VII's attorney's fee provision, which was "to
facilitate the bringing of discrimination complaints." ld. at 63.
The Court reasoned that "[p]ermitting an attorney's fee award
to one in respondent's position furthers this goal, while a
contrary rule would force the complainant to bear the costs of
mandatory state and local proceedings and thereby inhibit the
enforcement of a meritorious discrimination claim." ld.
The Court added that its construction of the Act was
consistent with Title VII's "scheme of interrelated and
complementary state and federal enforcement" that envisioned
"proceedings before the EEOC and in federal court as
supplements to available" state remedies for employment
discrimination, ld. at 65. And, in language especially apt here,
12
the Court observed that "the availability of a federal fee award
for work done in state proceedings following EEOC referral and
deferral should not depend upon whether the complainant
ultimately finds it necessary to sue in federal court to obtain
relief other than attorney's fees." ld. at 65-66. As the Court
emphasized, it "would be anomalous to award fees to the
complainant who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in
obtaining state or local remedies, but to deny an award to the
complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress' plan that
federal policies" be vindicated short of federal court litigation.
ld at 66. Based on these factors, the Court held that Title ViI's
"authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit
solely to obtain a award of attorney's fees for legal work done
in state and local proceedings." ld.; see also White v. New
Hampshire Dep 'tof Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n. 13
(1982) (reaffirming Carey's holding).
To be sure, six years later the Court in Crest Street held
that an independent suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to recover
attorney's fees under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was not authorized. 479 U.S. 6 (1986). Title VI prohibits
discrimination by programs receiving federal assistance. In
contrast to Title VII, Title VI contains no mandatory deferral
provision and the administrative enforcement of the Act is
carried out by federal agencies in informal proceedings in which
private parties have no statutory role. The Crest Street plaintiffs
had filed an administrative complaint with the United States
Department of Transportation ("DOT") to block the
construction of a highway through a predominantly black
neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina. 1d at 10-11. Based
on their complaint, DOT initiated an informal proceeding with
federal grantees to resolve the dispute, which was eventually
settled in plaintiffs' favor, ld Ultimately, they filed an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for fees incurred during the
13
administrative proceedings, ld. at 11. In holding that section
1988 does not authorize suits exclusively for attorney's fees for
participation in agency proceedings under Title VI, the Court
found it "entirelyreasonable to limit the award of attorney's fees
to those parties who, in order to obtain relief, found it necessary
to file a complaint in court." Id at 14. The Court also placed
considerable emphasis on the "plain import of the statutory
language" of section 1988, which provides that "in the action or
proceeding to enforce the civil rights laws listed.., the court
may award attorney's fees." ld. at 12 (emphasis in original).
This language -- especially the "to enforce" proviso -- stands
in stark contrast to Title VII's attorney fee provision at issue in
Carey, and relied on here, which provides for an attorney's fee
"[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 3
3The government's amicus brief in CrestStreet highlights
the structural differences between Title VI and Title VII which,
in the government's View, justified the different results in Crest
Street and Carey. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, No. 85-767, O.T. 1985. According to
the government, the question in Crest Street turned on the
"nature of the administrative proceeding, particularly whether
the proceeding is an 'integral' component of the private
enforcement scheme." Id. at 20 (citation omitted). The
government argued that the answer to that question was "no"
because Title VI establishes an administrative enforcement
process that contemplates no formal role for complainants;
rather, the "proceedings are meant to focus primarily on
assuring the funding recipient's compliance with Title VI rather
than providing individualized relief to victims of discrimination."
ld at 14. In contrast, the government defended Carey because
(continued...)
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Adhering to Carey and rejecting the applicability of
CrestStreet to Title VII cases, the lower courts have, until now,
uniformly held that Title VII's jurisdictional provision authorizes
suits solely for attorney's fees and costs. The most thorough
lower court decision is Judge Heaney's opinion for a unanimous
panel in Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.
1988). Although Jones recognized that the plaintiff in Carey
initially sought merits relief as well as fees, whereas in Jones the
plaintiff was seeking only fees, the court found this to be "a
distinction without a difference" in answering the jurisdictional
question. Id. at 497. Rather, the meaningful distinction lay
between Title VII and section 1988. Crest Street, the Eighth
Circuit found, was inapposite both because section 1988 can be
distinguished from Title VII "on the basis of plain statutory
language and legislative history," and because "[m]andatory
deferral distinguishes the present case from actions which arise
under other civil rights laws." Id at 498 n. 10. As the court saw
it, "[t]he analysis of Title VII offered by the majority in Carey
requires a decision in favor of Jones." Id. at 497. 4
_(...continued)
Title VII plaintiffs were "entitled to attorney's fees for the time
spent in administrative proceedings . . because those
proceedings were an essential, indeed mandatory, part of the
private enforcement of the relevant statutory scheme." Id. The
government found its conclusion on this point bolstered by the
"to enforce" language which appears in section 1988 but not in
section 2000e-5(k), arguing that an action "filed for the sole
purpose of recovering attorney's fees under Section 1988" is not
one to enforce Title VI. ld at 26 n. 12 (emphasis in original).
The Eighth Circuit's analysis is fully consistent with
(continued...)
15
The Tenth Circuit followed suit in Sladefor Estate of
Slade v. Postal Service, 952 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1991). In
Slade, the plaintiff's complaint initially included a claim for back
wages, as well as one for attorney's fees, but the plaintiff
abandoned his back pay claim, and the court treated the case as
presenting the question whether Title VII authorizes an
"independent suit solely for attorney's fees." ld. at 360. That
question, in the court's view, turned on whether Crest Street or
Carey was the controlling precedent. CrestStreet did not apply,
the court reasoned, because of the marked differences between
the language of section 1988 and section 2000e-5(k). "In its
holding [in Crest Street] that an independent action for
attorney's fees is not authorized by § 1988, .the Court
considered the plain language of the statute 'in the action or
proceeding to enforce the civil rights laws listed.'" 952 F.2d at
360-61 (quoting Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 12) (emphasis in
CrestStreet). Distinguishing section 1988's language ffi'omTitle
VII's, the Tenth Circuit noted that "It]he applicable statute here
does not require that the federal court proceeding be brought to
enforce the laws set forth in § 2000e. Therefore, Crest Street
is not dispositive of the issue of jurisdiction in this case." Id
(emphasis in original). What the Tenth Circuit found
dispositive, however, was this Court's decision in Carey, which
4(...cominued)
Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 240-41
(1985), which distinguished section 1988 from Title VII by
pointing both to the significant semantic differences (mainly the
absence of the "to enforce" language in Title VII) and to the fact
that Title VII "expressly requires the claimant to pursue
available state remedies before commencing proceedings in a
federal forum,"in contrast to other civil rights statutes like Title
VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which do not require exhaustion.
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in its view compelled the conclusion that district courts have
jurisdiction in Title VII fee-only cases. S
The battle over whether Carey or Crest Street governs
in civil rights cases brought solely for fees has been waged not
only in Title VII cases, but also in cases arising under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 20
U.SC. §§ 1400 - 1485. IDEA contains an attorney's fee
provision modeled on Title VII's; indeed, in all pertinent
respects the provisions are identical. Compare 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(4)(B) ("In any action or proceeding brought under this
subsection, the court in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parent[].., who is the
The commentators have agreed with Petitioner that the
only way to reconcile the tension between Carey and Crest
Street is to conclude that, at least insofar as Title VII cases are
concerned, district courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions
brought solely for fees. The commentators point to several
factors in support of their conclusion: the mandatory nature of
Title VIl's deferral provisions, the absence of the "to enforce"
language contained in section 1988, and the policy reasons
favoring fee-only litigation recounted in Carey. See, e.g.,
Schreck, Attorneys' Feesfor Administrative Proceedings under
theEducation of the Handicapped Act: Of Carey, Crest Street
and Congressional lntent, 60 Temp. L.Q. 599 (1987); Silver,
Evening the Odds: The Case for Attorneys' Fee Awards for
Administrative Resolution of Title VIand Title VIIDisputes, 67
N.C.L. Rev. 379 (1989); Brand, The Second Front in the Fight
for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory
Fees, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 291,322 (1990); Comment, Attorney's
Fees for § 1983 Claims in Fair Hearings: Rethinking Current
Jurisprudence, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1267 (1988).
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prevailing party ") with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ("In any action
or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party.., a reasonable attorney's fee.
•. as part of the costs"); see Moore v. District of Columbia, 907
F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998
(1990)•
In the aftermath of Carey and Crest Street, a number of
circuits have considered whether district courts have jurisdiction
to entertain IDEA cases brought solely for fees incurred in
administrative proceedings. The interpretative question under
the IDEA is identical to that presented here under Title VII,
since the operative language is the same. The leading case
remains the D.C. Circuit's unanimous, 1990 en banc decision in
Moore, which considered and flatly rejected the argument that
CrestStreet's approach should be applied to statutory language
like that set forth in the IDEA and Title VII for essentially the
same reasons given by the courts in Jones and Slade. 907 F.2d
at 168-70. Moore also noted that Congress, in adding the fee
provision to the IDEA in 1986, Wanted to ensure that parents
who prevailed in administrative proceedings under the IDEA
could seek fees in court. This legislative history bolstered the
court's conclusion that Carey and not Crest Street establishes
the governing law. ld. at 172-76. Insofar as Petitioner can
determine, every circuit to address the question thus far has
concluded that district courts have jurisdiction under the IDEA
to entertain fee-only cases. 6
6 The decisions containing the most extensive discussion
of this issue include: Brown v. Griggsville Community Unit Sch.
Dist., 12 F.3d 681, 683-85 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.)
(approx,fng of reasoning inMoore); Duane M v. Orleans Parish
(continued...)
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The Fourth Circuit's opinion breaks ranks and holds that
district courts lack jurisdiction in Title VII cases to entertain
cases brought solely to obtain attorney's fees. Although the
court below was quick to side-step Carey, it provided little by
way of coherent explanation for its ruling. For example, despite
Carey's unqualifiedholding that federal courts havejurisdiction
under Title VII to entertain "a suit solely to obtain an award of
attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings," the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion and held that Carey applies only when the plaintiff's
complaint also seeks merits relie£ Compare Carey, 447 U.S. at
66, with Chris, 221 F.3d at 654.
6(... continued)
Sch. Bd, 861 F.2d 1I5, 117-20 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v.
Bullitt County Sch. Bd., 854 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1988); and
Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940
F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1991). Other relevant decisions
include: Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 111 F.3d
847, 851 (llth Cir. 1997); Mitten v. Muscogee County Sch.
Dist., 877 F.2d 932, 935 (llth Cir. 1989); Angela L. v.
Pasadenalndep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir.
1990); Johnson v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 949 F.2d 1000,
1003 (8th Cir. 1991); King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 2000
U.S App. LEXIS 24490 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Counsel v.
Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 740 n.9 (2d Cir. 1988) (dictum). The
Fourth Circuit has also said in dicta that district courts have
jurisdiction over fee-only IDEA cases, see Combs by Combs v.
SchoolBd of Rockingham County, 15 F.3d 357, 359 n.10 (4th
Cir. 1994), but the panel ruling here makes no mention of
Combs, let alone tries to reconcile the two decisions.
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Equally troubling is the fact that the Fourth Circuit
nowhere explains why the Carey rule should apply when the
plaintiff prevailed in state administrative proceedings, but not
before the EEOC. As explained in more detail below, Congress
wanted to ensure that federal employees who opt to bring their
claims to the EEOC, rather than to federal court, retain a full
opportunity for judicial review of the EEOC's final decisions in
their cases. When Congress expanded Title VII to cover federal
employees in 1972, it added the separate jurisdictional grant set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), which empowers any federal
employee "aggrieved by the [EEOC's] final disposition" of her
complaint to file suit in the district court. Nothing in that
provision excludes cases in which the claimant is aggrieved by
an inadequate award of fees and costs. Petitioner expressly
invoked this provision in her complaint and briefed it at length
before both lower courts. Yet the Fourth Circuit leaves its
impact unaddressed. Unless the Fourth Circuit intended to treat
Crest Streetas having overruled Carey, which it appears to have
done without saying so, then its failure to address this key
provision of Title VII is inexprlcable. The confusion engendered
by the Fourth Circuit about Carey's viability and the meaning of
section 2000e-16(c) further underscores the need for review.
B. The Ruling Below Wrongly Denigrates The
Importance Of Attorney's Fees In Title VII Cases
And Encourages Complainants To By-Pass
Administrative Remedies.
In concluding that Title VII does not authorize district
courts to entertain fee-only cases, the court below misreads Title
VII and denigrates the central role that attorney's fees play in
the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act. The upshot of the
court's ruling is that Title VII complainants are likely to bring
their claims into federal court as soon as possible and end-run
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the state and federal agencies that Congress intended to play an
integral role in resolving discrimination complaints. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the jurisdictional grant set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) --which speaks of "actions brought
under this subchapter" -- refers only to complaints "to remedy
an unlawful employment practice, rather than [complaints that]
contain only a single claim for attorney's fees and costs." 221
F.3d at 652 (App. A9). In the court's view, Congress' reference
to "this subchapter" was intended to draw a bright-line between
"the substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII, specifically the
right to be free from employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin" on the one hand, and
ancillary remedies like fees and costs on the other hand. ld. at
653 (App. A10). As the court put it, "a suit solely for attorney's
fees and costs is not an 'action[] brought under [Title VII].'"
Id. at 654 (App. A13-A14).
The Fourth Circuit's suggestion that the attorney's fee
provision of Title VII provides less of a substantive guarantee
than do other remedial provisions of the Act conflicts not only
with Cceley,447 U.S. at 63, but also with a number of decisions
of this Court emphasizing the pivotal role the fee provision plays
in Title VII's enforcement. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court noted that, although the
legislative history of Title VII's fee provision is "sparse," it is
clear that the provision was included "to make it easier for a
plalntiffoffimited means to bring a meritorious suit." ld. at 420
(quotation omitted). Title VII casts the plaintiff in the role of
a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy -- the
elimination of discrimination in employment -- that Congress
considered of the highest priority. Id at 416; see also Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401-402 (1968) (in
cases under the public accommodation provisions of Title II of
the Civil Rights Act, a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily
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recover an attorney's fee"). For that reason, the Court has made
clear "that the Piggie Park standard of awarding attorney's fees
to a success_l plaintiff is equally applicable in an action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 417; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
Based on this Court's rulings underscoring the
importance of Title VII's fee provision, Carey observed: "One
aspect of complete relief [under Title VII] is an award of
attorney's fees, which Congress considered necessary to the
fialfillment of federal goals. Provision of a federal award of
attorney's fees is not different from any other aspect of the
ultimate authority of the federal courts to enforce Title VII."
447 U.S. at 68. As an illustration, Carey went on to say that if,
for example, state law did not authorize back pay but the
plaintiff was entitled to it under Title VII, "the plaintiff may
proceed in federal court to 'supplement' the state remedy." ld.
Building on this example, Carey concluded that an award of
attorney's fees is no different, and that federal courts remain
open to fill the void left by an administrr, ative remedy that falls
short of providing a comprehensive remedy under Title VII,
including adequate fees. Id The Fourth Circuit's opinion is
directly contrary to the Court's reasoning in this regard.
Nor is the Fourth Circuit's decision consistent with the
structure and design of Title VII itself. The linchpin of the
ruling below is the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a fee-only
action is not one brought under "this subchapter," and hence not
within the coverage of section 2000e-5(f)(3). But the
"subchapter" referred to in section 2000e-5(f)(3) is "Subchapter
VI--Equal Employment Opportunities" of "Chapter 21--Civil
Rights" of Title 42 of the United States Code, which is
commonly referred to as Title VII. Title ViI's attorney fee
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provision, set forth in section 2000e-5(k), is plainly part of the
same "subchapter" as the provisions the court characterizes as
"substantive" guarantees. Thus, the line the court draws is of its
own invention, without statutory basis. 7
Finally, the decision below reflects a lack of sensitivity
to the vital role that fee-shifting statutes play in the enforcement
of the important federal policies embodied in Title VII. As
noted above, Congress considered Title VII's attorney's fee
provision integral to the Act's enforcement. The court below
paid little heed to that consideration, as one hypothetical
illustration shows. Suppose that the EEOC, instead of refilsing
to award Petitioner's counsel her market rate, had denied her
fees altogether, for reasons unauthorized by Title VII. Under
the panel's approach, the courthouse door would nonetheless be
shut to Chris and her counsel -- and every other claimant who
prevailed before the EEOC or a state agency but was dissatisfied
with the fee award -- despite the presence &sections 2000e-
5(3(3 ) and 16(c). That result would be indefensible in terms of
the remedial policies underlying Title VII, as this Court made
clear in Carey, Christiansburg Garment, and Albemarle Paper,
but it is the inescapable consequence of the ruling below.
7Indeed, it is far from clear that the Fourth Circuit's
ruling would stop at attorney's fees. Attorney's fees, after all,
are only one remedy of many available under Title VII. The
Fourth Circuit's rationale -- namely, that Title VII's
jurisdictional reach extends only to the Act's substantive
guarantees and not to its remedies -- might well bar suit for
back pay by a complainant who had otherwise prevailed in an
administrative proceeding. That result, of course, would stand
Title VII on its head, and run counter to this Court's reasoning
in Westv. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999).
23
C. The Ruling Below Will Frustrate Congress' Effort
To Encourage Federal Employees To Pursue
Discrimination Claims Administratively.
The adverse effect that the ruling below will have on the
administrative resolution of Title VII claims is brought into
sharp focus by examining the ruling's impact on federal
employees. This Court has observed that, insofar as federal
employees are concerned, Title VII "provides for a careffialblend
0f administrative and judicial enforcement powers." Brown v.
GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976). Congress overhauled Title VII
in 1972 to "proscribe[] federal employment discrimination and
establish[] an administrative and judicial enforcement system."
Id at 829. The procedures now are spelled out in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16, and are supplemented by detailed EEOC regulations.
See 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (1999). Taken together, these
provisions create "a dispute resolution system that requires a
complaining party to pursue administrative relief prior to court
action, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less
expensive resolution of disputes within the Federal Government
and outsideofcourt." Westv. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1910. But
the rules make clear that ordinarily a federal employee may elect
to go to court once more than 180 days have elapsed before
either the agency or the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-16(c);
29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 (2000).
According to the most recent statistics compiled by the
EEOC, it takes the CIA an average of 722 days, or nearly two
years, to resolve an EEO complaint. EEOC Federal Sector
Report, at 36. Should the employee opt to appeal to the EEOC
she should anticipate that it will take that agency an addition
473 days to conduct appellate review. Id at 65. Title VII
makes crystal clear, however, that ira federal employee opts to
appeal to the EEOC, she retains her right to file suit to challenge
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the EEOC's ruling if she is "aggrieved" by the EEOC's final
disposition, or if she is dissatisfied with the EEOC's progress
after more than 180 days have elapsed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(c); see alsoBrown v. GSA,425 U.S. at 832. The purpose of
this provision, which in effect gives federal employees two bites
at the apple if they go first to the EEOC, is plainly to encourage
employees to avail themselves of the administrative forum at the.
EEOC, thereby avoiding federal court litigation if at all possible.
West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1910-11; Brown v. GSA, 425
U.S. at 832-33.
The Fourth Circuit's ruling threatens to unravel
Congress' finely wrought deferral scheme. If the Fourth
Circuit's ruling stands and EEOC fee determinations are
unreviewable unless joined with a merits claim, then federal
employees will be inclined to go to the federal courts as soon as
possible, especially to those courts that adhere to the Laffey
formula or calculate fees on the basis of market rates, rather
than run a risk of significant under-compensation or non-
compensation before administrative agencies. Every year,
federal employees file more than 25,000 discrimination claims
with their agencies; over 8,000 of these claims end up before the
EEOC. EEOC Federal Sector Report, at 19, 61; West v.
Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1911 (citing fiscal year 1997 statistics).
Even if only an additional ten or twenty percent of these
complainants bring their claims directly into federal court, the
dislocation and burden on the federal courts, especially those in
the Washington, D.C. area, could be substantial.
This is hardly an idle concern. Indeed, it was precisely
this concern about the exodus of cases from the EEOC that
impelled the Court in West v. Gibson to rule that compensatory
damages are available to a Title VII plaintiff.not only in court,
but also before the EEOC. Without that power, the Court
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reasoned, cases would be "force[d] into court . . . that the
EEOC might otherwise have resolved." 119 S. Ct. at 1910.
The same factors motivated the Court in Carey. As the Court
there stressed, the "existence of an incentive to get into federal
court, such as the availability of a fee award, would ensure that
almost all Title VII complainants would abandon state [here
federal administrative] proceedings as soon as possible. This,
however, would undermine Congress' intent to encourage full
use of state [here federal] remedies." Id. The Court's
observations in Westand Carey apply with fi.filforce in this case.
Because the ruling below places in jeopardy Congress' effort to
encourage federal employees to forego litigation and rely instead
on administrative agencies to resolve discrimination claims, this
case merits review by this Court.
The Fourth Circuit's ruling deals a serious blow to the
effective enforcement of Title VII, which, as Congress well
understood, depends on the ready availability of a reasonable
attorney's fee for a prevailing plaintiff. By misreading Title
VII's jurisdictional provision, the ruling below deprives Title
VII complainants of an opportunity to litigate their attorney's
fees claims before a federal court. For federal employees, the
ruling below gives them a Hobson's choice: They either forfeit
their right to full administrative review and head straight to
court, or they remain before the agencies and risk having
attorney's fees awarded at below market rates, or denied
entirely, with no recourse. Neither of those results makes sense,
nor are they consistent with Congress' objectives in the Civil
Rights Act. Because the Fourth Circuit's ruling is contrary to
Carey, conflicts with decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits,
and is irreconcilable with the unbroken line of authority
interpreting identical language in IDEA, this case merits review
by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
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BULLOCK, District Judge:
The jurisdictional provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 provides that, "Each United States district court
and each United States court of a place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under [Title VIII." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t0(3). We are
asked to decide in this case whether the phrase "actions brought
A2
under [Title VII]," as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3),
includes an action brought for the sole purpose of recovering
attorney's fees and costs for work performed by counsel during
administrative proceedings under Title VII that resulted in the
settlement, prior to the filing of a judicial complaint, of all of
Plaintiffs Title VII claims. The district court held that the
phrase "actions brought under [Title VII]" referred only to legal
proceedings instituted to enforce substantive rights guaranteed
by Title VII and therefore the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over PlaintiffJAppellant's claims brought
solely for attorney's fees and costs. See Chris v. Tenet, 57 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (E.D.Va. 1999). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the district court's dismissal of the actions for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
This appeal arises from two separate actions which were
consolidated on appeal. Plaintiff/Appellant, Kelly Jean Chris 1
("Chris"), is an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
(the "CIA" or "Agency"). In 1993, Chris filed a claim for sex
discrimination with the CIA's equal employment opportunity
office (the "Agency's EEO office"). The Agency's EEO office
investigated the allegations and issued a report on March 30,
1994. Thereafter, on May 2, 1994, Chris filed a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In July
1994, while her first claim of sex discrimination was still
pending, Chris filed a second claim of sex discrimination with
the Agency's EEO office alleging that the CIA had initiated a
1"Kelly Jean Chris" is Plaintiff/Appellant's pseudonym,
assigned to her for purposes of these proceedings. Her real
name cannot be disclosed due to the classified nature of her
government work.
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criminal investigation into her relationship with a foreign
national as a means of retaliating against her for filing her first
complaint of sex discrimination. The Agency's EEO office
investigated the second claim and issued a final report in March
1995. Following discovery, the parties entered into a
confidential settlement agreement in June 1995 resolving both
of Chris's complaints. The settlement agreement provided that
in the event the parties did not reach an agreement on the
amount of fees and costs due Chris, the CIA would pay her
reasonable fees and costs in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §
1614.501(e). 2
The parties did not reach an agreement on attorney's fees
and costs, and Chris filed a petition with the CIA claiming a
total of $79,484.00 in fees based on 256.4 hours of attorney
work at $310.00 per hour. Chris also sought $1,920.84 in
costs. The CIA issued its final decision on the fee petition on
August 23, 1995, and awarded fees totaling $48,350.00, which
represented a fee award of $250.00 per hour for 193.4 hours of
attorney work, and costs totaling $1,237.32. Chris appealed the
award to the EEOC. The EEOC issued a decision on July 19,
1996, awarding Chris fees of $59,510.00, which was based on
an hourly rate of $275.00 and included an award for the time
Chris's counsel spent representing her in an agency Office of
2At the time of the settlement, the regulation provided, in
relevant part, that:
If the complainant, the [complainant's] representative, and
the agency cannot reach an agreement on the amount of
attorney's fees or costs.., the agency shall issue a decision
determining the amount of attorney's fees or costs due ....
The decision shall include a notice of right to appeal to the
EEOC ....
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(A) (1995).
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Inspector General investigation, as well as an award for the time
Chris's counsel expended pursuing her appeal to the EEOC on
the fee petition matter. The EEOC also increased the award of
costs to $1,534.26. Both Chris and the CIA requested that the
EEOC reconsider its decision. The EEOC agreed to reconsider
its decision, and on January 7, 1998, the EEOC lowered the fee
award to $56,593.00, but increased the award of costs to
$1,582.26. In its order of reconsideration, the EEOC advised
Chris that "the decision [was] final, and there [was] no ffiarther
fight of administrative appeal from the [EEOC's] decision." (J.A.
at 35). The EEOC also advised Chris that if the CIA failed to
comply with the EEOC's decision, Chris could "petition the
Commission for enforcement of the order," or "file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or
following an administrative petition for enforcement." Id. In the
alternative, the EEOC informed Chris that she had "the right to
file a civil action on the underlying complaint," subject to
statutory deadlines for such an action. Id.
Chris did not pursue one of those options, but filed a civil
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking the difference between the attorney's fees and
costs awarded by the EEOC and the attorney's fees and costs
she requested in her fee petition. Thereafter, the matter was
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, and the CIA
moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), to
dismiss Chris's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On July 28, 1999, the district court granted the CIA's motion
and dismissed Chris's complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Chris filed a timely notice of appeal.
While Chris's first two complaints of sex discrimination
were pending, Chris filed a third complaint of discrimination
with the Agency's EEO office in February 1995, alleging
discriminatory reprisal. In September 1996, this claim was also
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resolved by way of a confidential settlement. This settlement
agreement also provided that, in the event the parties did not
reach an agreement on the amount of the attorney's fees due
Chris, the CIA would pay her reasonable attorney's fees in
accordance with 29 C.FR. § 1614.501(e)) Pursuant to the
settlement, Chris's counsel submitted a fee petition to the
Agency requesting compensation for 6.6 hours of work at an
hourly rate of$315.00. The CIA agreed to compensate Chris's
counsel for all 6.6 hours of work, but concluded that the
appropriate rate was $275.00 per hour. Chris appealedthe
CIA's decision to the EEOC, seeking the difference between the
hourly rate claimed by Chris and the hourly rate awarded by the
CIA. The EEOC determined that a reasonable hourly rate was
$295.00, and in a decision dated July 15, 1999, the EEOC
ordered the Agency to pay an additional $20.00 per hour for
each of the 6.6 hours of attorney work claimed by Chris. As in
its prior decision, the EEOC advised Chris that if the CIA failed
to comply with the EEOC's decision, Chris could "petition the
Commission for enforcement of the order," or "file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or
following an administrative petition for enforcement." (J.A. at
81). In the alternative, the EEOC informed Chris that she had
"the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint,"
subject to statutory deadlines for such an action. Id.
On August 16, 1999, Chris filed a civil complaint in the
Eastern District of Virginia seeking attorney's fees for work
performed by her attorney while Chris's third claim of sex
discrimination was in the administrative process. The Agency
moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court, on
September 15, 1999, in an amended order, dismissed the
3The Agency did not dispute the amount of costs requested
by Chris with regard to her third complaint of discrimination.
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complaint for the reasons stated in the July 28, 1999,
memorandum opinion dismissing Chris's first complaint. Chris
filed a timely notice of appeal and the second appeal was
consolidated with Chris's first appeal.
II.
This court reviews de novo the district court's dismissal of
Chris's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Randall v. UnitedStates, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also UnitedStates v. Linney, 134 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating that issues of statutory construction are reviewed de
novo). Chris contends that Title ViI's grant of discretionary
authority to federal courts to award attorney's fees and costs,
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), is a substantive right that may be
enforced in a suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.SC. §
2000e-5(f)(3), solely for attorney's fees and costs following
settlement of all substantive claims during the course of the
administrative process. 4 Section 2000e-5(f)(3), the statutory
provision granting subject matter jurisdiction to federal district
courts over actions brought under Title VII, states, in relevant
part, "Each United States district court and each United States
court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
4An award of attorney's fees and costs under Title VII is
authorized by 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k), which states:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of
the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added). The
issue before the court is whether Chris's claims solely for
attorney's fees and costs are "actions brought under this
subchapter," and thus within the jurisdiction of the federal
COUrtS. 5
Statutory interpretation necessarily begins with an analysis
of the language of the statute. See Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,685, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692, 105 S. Ct. 2297
(1985). When analyzing the meaning of a statute, we must first
"determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 340, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). If the
language is plain and "the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent," we need not inquire further. United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,240-41,109 S.Ct. 1026, 103
L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). "[T]he sole function of the courts is to
enforce [the statute] according to its terms." Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442
(1917). Our analysis of the plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is guided "by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole." Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of
42 U.S.C § 20003-5(0(3). "Action" is commonly understood
to mean "a proceeding in a court of justice by which one
5Although Chris is an employee of the federal government,
the ability of federal employees to seek attorney's fees and costs
is subject to the same statutory provisions as private sector
employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (incorporating by
reference 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0 through (k) to any "civil
action[ ]" brought by a federal employee under Title VII).
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demands or enforces one's right." Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary at 54 (1983); see also Black's Law
Dictionary at 26 (deluxe 5th ed. 1979) (defining "action" as
"[t]erm in its usual legal sense means a suit brought in a court");
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage at 20 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining "action" as "a mode of proceeding in court to enforce
a private right, to redress or prevent a private wrong, or to
punish a public offense"). "Under" is commonly understood to
mean "subject to the authority, control, guidance, or instruction
of." Webster'sNinth New Collegiate Dictionary at 1285; see
also Black's Law Dictionary at 1368 (deluxe 5th ed. 1979)
(defining "under" as meaning "according to"); Dictionary of
Modern Legal Usage at 896 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that "under"
"is preferable to pursuant to when the noun that follows refers
to a... statute"). Finally, "this subchapter" refers to "Subchapter
VI--Equal Employment Opportunities" of "Chapter 21--Civil
Rights" of Title 42 of the United States Code, which is
commonly referred to as Title VII. Thus, as the district court
correctly concluded, the phrase "actions brought under this
subchapter" refers to legal proceedings in a court of law to
enforce the substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII,
specifically the right to be free from employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
This anatysis of.the meaning of"actions brought under this
subchapter" is buttressed by the specific context in which the
language appears. The first sentence of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(0)(3) contains the jurisdictional grant to district courts
over "actions brought under [Title VIII." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3). The next sentence provides four alternatives as
the proper venue for "such an action." lg Pursuant to 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-5(0(3), proper venue under Title VII may be where the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
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committed, where the employment records relevant to the
alleged unlawful employment practice are maintained, where the
aggrieved party would have worked absent the alleged unlawful
employment practice, or, if the respondent is not found in any of
the aforementioned places, where the respondent has its
principal office. See id This structural design in which proper
venue is controlled by facts associated with the alleged unlawful
employment practice supports the conclusion that to be an
"action[ ] brought under this subchapter" the civil action must
involve a claim to remedy an unlawful employment practice,
rather than contain only a single claim for attorney's fees and
costs.
This conclusion is also supported by the manner in which
other provisions of Title VII use the term "action" or its plural
form. The terms "action" or "actions" appear throughout Title
VII and are consistently used to refer to a court proceeding to
prevent or remedy an unlawful employment practice. Also, as
the district court noted:
After the "action[ ] under this subchapter" is brought in
federal court, it becomes the duty of the chief judge to
designate "immediately" a judge to hear the case, and then
that judge must set the case for hearing "at the earliest
practicable date and [ ] cause the case to be in every way
expedited." § 2000e- 5(f)(4)-(0(5 ). While these
requirements are both sensible and understandable in
connection with claims of employment discrimination or
retaliation, they seem incongruous, if not inappropriate,
when applied to an action solely for attorney's fees. It is
doubtful that Congress intended to order expedition of
claims brought solely to recover attorney's fees.
Chris, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
Our consideration of the ordinary meaning of the language
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of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), as well as the context in which
that language is used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and
throughout Title VII, leads us to conclude that the meaning of
"actions brought under this subchapter" is plain and
unambiguous. The jurisdictional grant in 42 US.C. §
2000e-5(t0(3) refers to legal proceedings in a court of law to
enforce the substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII,
specifically the right to be free from employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Importantly, the result dictated by our interpretation of Section
2000e-5(f)(3) does not preclude a prevailing complainant from
claiming fees and costs; rather, it merely limits the complainant
to claiming fees and costs solely in the forum where the
substantive claims are ultimately resolved.
Interpreting Title VII as not permitting an action solely for
attorney's fees and costs is also consistent with the statutory
scheme of Title VII. Congress enacted Title VII "to assure
equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39
L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). To fulfill this goal, Congress created a
dispute-resolution system that requires a person with a
complaint of illegal discrimination, whether the complainant is
a federal employee or a private-sector employee, to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.
See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (federal employees); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(c), (f) (private sector employees). As the district court
noted, Title VII, including the creation of the EEOC, reflects a
congressional intent to use administrative conciliation as the
primary means of handling claims, thereby encouraging quicker,
less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes. See
Chris, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 336. To interpret Section 2000e-5(f)(3)
All
as permitting a suit solely for attorney's fees and costs incurred
during the course of the Title VII administrative process would
run counter to the congressional aim of quick, less formal, and
less expensive resolution of employment disputes.
Chris argues that New York Gaslight Club, lnc. v. Carey,
447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed 2d 723 (1984), dictates
that we conclude that Title VII permits a complaint solely for
attorney's fees and costs. We disagree. In Carey, the Supreme
Court held that Section 2000e-5(0 and Section 2000e-5(k) of
Title VII "authorize a federal-court action to recover an award
of attorney's fees for work done by the prevailing complainant
in state proceedings to which the complainant was referred
pursuant to the provisions of Title VII." Carey, 447 U.S. at 71.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority stated:
It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant
who is unsuccessful or only partially successffial in
obtaining state or local remedies, but to deny an award to
the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress'
plan that federal policies be vindicated at the state or local
level. Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize
fee awards for work done in administrative proceedings,
we must conclude that [Title VIi's] authorization of a civil
suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an
award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and
local proceedings.
ld. at 66. The Carey majority went on to note that:
We note that if fees Were authorized only when the
complainant found an independent reason for suing in
federal court under Title VII, such a ground almost always
could be found.... The existence of an incentive to get into
federal court, such as the availability of a fee award, would
ensure that almost all Title VII complainants would
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abandon state proceedings as soon as possible. This,
however, would undermine Congress' intent to encourage
full use of state remedies.
ld. at 65 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2024.
Chris's reliance on Carey is misplaced for at least two
reasons. First, the plaintiffin Carey, unlike Chris, initially sought
relief in federal court on the merits of her claims in addition to
her claim for attorney's fees. See id. at 58, 100 S.Ct. 2024; see
also id at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating "this federal
litigation was commenced in order to obtain relief.., on the
merits ... and not simply to recover attorney's fees. Whether
Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action solely
to recover costs, including attorney's fees ... is not only doubtful
but is a question that is plainly not presented ...."). Second, in
North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community
Council, lnc., 479 U.S 6, 107 S. Ct. 336, 93 L.Ed.2d 188
(1986), the Supreme Court re-examined the policy concerns
noted in the Carey decision and dismissed them as "dicta" and
"exaggerated." Crest St., 479 U.S. at 13-14.
Although CrestSt. is not controlling on the issue before us,
its reasoning is persuasive. In Crest St., the Crest Street
Community Council (the "Community Council") filed an
administrative complaint with the United States Department of
Transportation alleging that a proposed plan by the North
Carolina Department of Transportation to extend a federally
funded expressway through a predominantly black
neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina, would violate Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 9, 107 S.Ct. 336.
The dispute was subsequently settled and, thereafter, the
Community Council filed a separate complaint in federal court
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to recover fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 6 See id. at 11,
107 S.Ct. 336.
The Supreme Court held that a suit for attorney's fees is
not an action to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in
Section 1988, and therefore a federal court is not authorized to
entertain a claim under Section 1988 solely for attorney's fees.
See id. In concluding that to be eligible for an award of fees
under Section 1988 a complainant must, at a minimum, file a
judicial complaint, the Court emphasized that "an award of
attorney's fees under § 1988 depends not only on the results
obtained, but also on what actions were needed to achieve those
results." ld at 14. According to the Court, "It is entirely
reasonable to limit the award of attorney's fees to those parties
who, in order to obtain relief, found it necessary to file a
complaint in court." ld This reasoning carries equal force when
applied to Chris's argument that Title VII's jurisdictional grant
vests federal courts with jurisdiction over civil actions brought
solely for attorney's fees and costs following settlement of all
substantive claims during Title VII's administrative process.
Because a suit solely for attorney's fees and costs is not an
"action[ ] brought under [Title VIII," i.e., a suit to enforce the
642 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [ 20 U.S.C § 1681 et
seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [ 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 [42 U.S.C § 2000d et seq.], or Section 13981 of
this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part &the costs ....
42 U.SC § 1988(b) (footnote omitted).
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substantive protections of Title VII, federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over civil actions brought solely for attorney's
fees and costs.
In reaching our conclusion, we are aware of the Eighth
Circuit's contrary decision on a similar issue in Jones v.
dmericanState Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988). In,Jones,
the Eighth Circuit stated that "the policy arguments" set forth in
the Carey decision dictated a conclusion that Title VII
authorized a suit solely for attorney's fees. See Jones, 857 F.2d
at 498. The policy arguments relied upon by the `jones panel
included the Supreme Court's belief in Carey that awarding
attorney's fees only when a party found it necessary to file a
complaint in court would be anomalous, see id., as well as the
Supreme Court's belief that the absence of a separate award for
attorney's fees would discourage complainants from seeking
relief or pursuing their claims to their rightful conclusions
because Title V/I defendants would use delay and continued
proceedings to pressure a complainant to settle, see id at 499.
The Jones decision was written almost two years after the
Supreme Court's decision in Crest St. expressly repudiated the
first policy argument as "dicta" and "exaggerated." Crest St.,
479 U.S. at 14. Furthermore, in Crest St. the Supreme Court
also rejected the second policy argument on the grounds that
awarding attorney's fees only when a party, in order to obtain
relief, found it necessary to file a complaint "creates a legitimate
incentive for potential civil rights defendants to resolve disputes
expeditiously, rather than risk the attorney's fees liability
connected to civil rights litigation." See id. at 15. The Eighth
Circuit did not address the implications of the Crest St. decision
and simply noted that the mandatory administrative deferral
system of Tire vii distinguished the Jones case from Crest St.,
which arose under Title VI and did not involve mandatory
administrative deferral. See Jones, 857 F.2d at 498 n. 10. We
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find this rationale unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the
Supreme Court's discussion and disavowal of certain policy
arguments underlying the Carey decision belie any assertion that
the Crest St. decision is not relevant to attorney's fees issues
under Title VII. Moreover, although Title VI, the statutory
framework at issue in Crest St., does not impose mandatory
participation in administrative proceedings, the absence of
mandatory administrative procedures was never discussed by the
Supreme Court as the basis of the Crest St. decision. Instead,
the Supreme Court focused on the fact that a suit solely for
attorney's fees under Section 1988 was not an action to enforce
any of the civil fights laws listed in Section 1988, just as a suit
solely for attorney's fees and costs is not an action under Title
VII. See Crest St., 479 U.S. at 15. For these reasons, we
respectfully decline to follow the Eighth Circuit's holding in
Jones.
III.
The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is limited
and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction which
Congress has prescribed. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d
391 (1994). The jurisdictional grant in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3) refers to legal proceedings in a court of law to
enforce the substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII,
specifically the fight to be free from employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Accordingly, the jurisdictional grant of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(i0)(3) does not extend to an independent action solely
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for attorney!s fees and costs incurred during the course of the
Title VII administrative process. 7 The orders of the district
court are therefore
AFFIRMED.
7Because we conclude that the district court lacked Subject
matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(3 ), we need
not address the CIA's alternative argument that Chris, upon
agreeing that any fee dispute would be resolved according to 29
C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), waived any right to seek attorney's fees
and costs in federal court.
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Kelly Jean CHRIS, Plaintiff,
V.
George J. TENET, Director Central
Intelligence Agency,
Defendant.
No. Civ. A. 99-494-A
United States District Court,
ED. Virginia,
Alexandria Division.
July 28, 1999
ELLIS, District Judge.
This action for attorney's fees presents a threshold
jurisdictional question -- unresolved in this circuit -- whether a
Title VII I claimant who settles her discrimination claims during
the administrative process, but who disputes the amount of the
EEOC fee award, may bring a federal action under Title VII
solely for attorney's fees. z For the reasons that follow, federal
ITitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
2This case presents the precise issue that Justice Stevens,
in a concurring opinion, noted remained unresolved after the
Supreme Court's decision in New YorkGas Light Club, Inc. v.
Carey. 447 U.S. 54, 64 L.Ed. 2d 723, 100 S.Ct. 2024 (1980).
In Carey the Court held that a Title VII complainant may
maintain a cause of action in federal court for attorney's fees
incurred in state or local administrative proceedings, ld. In his
(continued...)
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courts have no jurisdiction under Title VII to hear such an
action.
1. 3
Plaintiff Kelly Jean Chris 4 ("Chris") brought this action
against her employer, the Central Intelligence Agency (the
"Agency") pursuant to §§ 706(k), 717(c) and 717(d) of Title
2(...continued)
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that a properly filed
underlying Title VII claim existed there, making it unnecessary
to decide whether a fee claim could be brought if federal
litigation "had never commenced" and the "aggrieved party had
obtained complete relief [on the merits of his claim] in the
administrative proceedings?' Id at 72, 100 S.Ct. 2024 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
3The facts recounted here are derived from the Complaint
and attachments thereto, including the EEOC's Granting of
Requests to Reconsider dated January 7, 1998. The instant
jurisdictional challenge proceeds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
Fed. R. Civ. P., by challenging whether these facts, which are
assumed to be true, suffice to support subject matter
jurisdiction. SeeAdams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.
1982) (stating that where the operative facts are undisputed, a
court proceeds in a manner similar to an evaluation of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, and assumes the
truth of all facts as stated in the complaint).
4"KellyJean Chris" is plaintiffs pseudonym, assigned to her
for purposes of this proceeding. Her real name cannot be
disclosed owing to the classified nature of her government
work.
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VII,s for the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees and costs
she incurred in pursuing her gender employment discrimination
claim against the Agency in proceedings before the EEOC. The
pertinent facts begin on September 8, 1993, when Chris,
represented by counsel, filed a claim for sex discrimination with
the Agency's Equal Employment Opportunity Office (the
"Agency's Office"). Specifically, she alleged discrimination
occurred when she was denied an overseas assignment because
she was "too attractive" and when she was issued a written
warning regarding her relationship with a foreign national. Such
a warning, she claimed, would not have been issued to a
similarly situated male employee. Reasonable attorney's fees and
costs were part of the relief she requested.
The Agency's Office investigated her allegations and issued
a report on March 30, 1994. Chris alleges that following the
issuance of this report, the Agency began retaliating against her
by commencing a criminal investigation of her relationship with
the foreign national. Accordingly, in July 1994, she filed a
second complaint with the Agency's Office, alleging both sex
discrimination and retaliation. As a result, the Agency's Office
conducted a second investigation and issued a final report in
March 1995.
On May 2, 1994, after the Agency issued its first report,
but prior to the submission of her second Agency complaint,
Chris filed a charge with the EEOC alleging a violation of Title
VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. Following
discovery, the parties entered into a confidential settlement
agreement, in June 1995, which, inter alia, provided that in the
event the parties did not reach agreement on the amount of the
fees and costs due Chris, the Agency would pay her reasonable
542 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 2000e-16(c), (d) (1994).
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fees and costs in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). This
regulation provides simply that where the parties cannot agree
on fees and costs, the Agency will determine these amounts,
which the claimant, if dissatisfied, may appeal to the EEOC. 6
In the event, the parties did not reach agreement on fees
and costs. Thus, as the "prevailing party" in her action, on July
15, 1995, Chris filed a petition with the Agency claiming a total
of $79,484 in fees based on 256.4 hours of attorney work at
$310 per hour,_ and $1,920.84 in costs) The Agency balked at
Chris' claimed hourly rate and offered $ 225 per hour instead.
When Chris rejected this offer, the Agency issued its final fee
award based on a $250 hourly rate. Eventually, the Agency paid
629 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
If the complainant, the [complainant's] representative and
the agency cannot reach an agreement on the amount of
attorney's fees or costs ... the agency shall issue a decision
determining the amount of attorney's fees or costs due ....
The decision shall include a notice of right to appeal to the
EEOC ....
29 C.FR. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(A) (emphasis added).
Tin determining the fee rate in her petition, Chris used the
"Laffey matrix" established by Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354, 371-75 (D.D.C. 1983) and subsequent
cases. This is a compensation scheme for awarding attorney's
fees based on years of legal experience. The validity of this
method is not material to the jurisdictional issue at bar.
8These figures are from the amended fee petition. The
original petition claimed 254.4 hours of attorney work and
$1,809.51 in costs.
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Chris attorney's fees in the amount of $48,350, representing a
fee award for 193.4 hours of attorney work at $250 per hour,
and costs of $1,237.32. Dissatisfied with the Agency's final
award, Chris nonetheless retained the $48,350, but sought
additional fees by pursuing her administrative remedies in an
appeal to the EEOC. She fared better at the EEOC, which
issued a decision on July 19, 1996 awarding her attorney's fees
in the amount of $59,510, based on a $275 hourly rate, and
costs of $1,534.26. In justifying an hourly rate lower than Chris'
requested rate, the EEOC determined that her counsel's
experience in employment discrimination law was insufficient to
warrant the requested $310 per hour. Both Chris and the
Agency filed requests for reconsideration with the EEOC, which
by decision issued on January 7, 1998, lowered its previous fee
award to a total of $56,593 because some of the claimed hours
were not compensable, but increased its costs award to
$1,582.26. The order on reconsideration, however, did not
depart from the EEOC's original determination that the rate of
$275 per hour was reasonable for Chris' attorney.
In its order on reconsideration, the EEOC advised Chris
that the "decision [was] final, and there [was] no further right of
administrative appeal from the [EEOC's] decision," and that she
"[had] the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United
States District Court." See Granting of Requests to Reconsider
in Chris v. Central Intelligence Agency, EEOC Request No.
05960785 (Jan. 7, 1998). The order further advised Chris that
if the Agency failed to comply with the EEOC's decision she
could (1) petition the EEOC for enforcement of the order; (2)
"file a civil action to enforce compliance with the [EEOC's]
order prior to or following an administrative petition for
enforcement"; or, (3) "file a civil action on the underlying
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complaint" subject to statutory deadlines for such an action? ld.
(emphasis added). _° Chris did not elect any of these options, but
instead filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia solely to collect the disputed attorney's fees
and costs, namely the difference between the $275 hourly rate
awarded by the EEOC and the $310 hourly rate she claimed.
This District of Columbia action was subsequently transferred
to the Eastern District of Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Thus, here Chris seeks "full" compensation for work performed
prior to the appeal of the Agency's final decision on her fee
petition, allegedly $32,262, reasonable attorney's fees; costs and
interest for the time spent appealing the Agency's final decision
to the EEOC, and fees and costs incurred in the instant action.
The Agency, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, has
moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
9The order rites 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g) which states that
if an agency fails to comply with an EEOC order, the
complainant has a fight "to file a civil action for enforcement of
the decision .,. and to seek judicial review of the agency's refusal
to implement the ordered relief.., or to commence de novo
proceedings pursuant to the appropriate statutes."
_eThe Agency complied with the EEOC's order to pay the
fees and costs as set out in the decision on reconsideration;
however, this payment was returned. In this regard, Chris'
federal court action is not to enforce the EEOC's order, a right
guaranteed her under 29 C.FR. § 1614.503(g) but.rather it is to
commence de novo proceedings solely on the amount of the
fees.
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12(b)(1). 11
II.
Chris claims reimbursement for fees and costs by virtue of
§ 2000e-(k) of Title VII, which states that "[i]n any action or
proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees) as part of the costs .... "42 U.S.C §
2000e-5(k) (emphasis added)) 2 More specifically, she claims
she was the "prevailing party" in the EEOC proceeding, which,
she _rther claims, was an "action or proceeding" under Title
VII. At the threshold, it is important to note that there is no
dispute that Chris is a "prevailing party" under § 2000e-5(k).
Nor is there any dispute that this is so notwithstanding that her
discrimination claim never reached the courts, but was settled
instead in the course of the administrative process) 3 Rather, the
tiThe Agency has also moved to dismiss the Complaint for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
which motion need not be addressed given the result reached on
the jurisdictional question.
_ZThespecific authority for Chris to bring a Title VII claim
is governed by § 2000e-16 because she is an employee of the
federal government; however the authority for federal
employees to seek attorney's fees is subject to the same
statutory constraints as those of private sector employees, as the
provisions of § 2000e-5(f) through (k) govern "civil actions"
brought by an employee of the federal government. See §
2000e-16(d).
13SeeFarrarv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566,
121 L.Ed 2d 494 (1992) (recognizing that settlement on the
(continued...)
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sole question presented here is whether Congress' jurisdictional
grant to federal courts under Title VII encompasses an action
solely for attorney's fees following a settlement of the claim in
the administrative proceeding. This is a question of statutory
construction given that under Title VII, the general provision
conferring jurisdiction on federal courts states that "[e]ach
United States district court and each United States court of a
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added). 14 Thus, the crux of
the issue is whether this action solely for attorney's fees
constitutes an "action[] under this subchapter" thereby
conferring jurisdiction on federal courts.
Because this question is one of statutory construction,
analysis must begin with the plain language of the statute. See
United Statesv. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241,
109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed. 2d 290 (1989); United States v.
Turkette,452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 LEd. 2d 246
(1981). And, where a statute's plain language is unambiguous
the judicial interpretive task is at an end; filrther judicial efforts
to construe or interpret the statute are unnecessary and
13(...continued)
merits renders a plaintiffa "prevailing party"); see also Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 4331 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 LEd. 2d
40 (1983) (same); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d
1343, 1359 (46`Cir. 1995) (same); EEOC v. Service News Co.,
898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
_4The reference to "this subchapter" encompasses all of
Subchapter VI -- Equal Employment Opportunities -- under
Title 42 of the United States Code and is typically referred to as
"Title VII." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17.
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inappropriate, as the statute must then be applied in accordance
with its plain meaning. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494U. S 827, 835, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 108L.
Ed. 2d 842 (1990); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 101
S. Ct. 698, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); Patten v. United States, 116
F.3d 1029, 1035 (4th Cir. 1997). When ambiguity infects a
statute, _5it is appropriate to resolve the issue through various
settled rules of statutory construction and interpretation. See
United States v. Jackson, 759 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 924, 106 S.Ct. 259, 88 L.Ed. 2d 265
(1985).
Given these principles, analysis properly begins with a
consideration of whether the key statutory phrase "actions
brought under this subchapter" has a plain and unambiguous
meaning. A persuasive case can be made that it has. When
analyzing statutory language, "words are given their common
usage." Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145. In this regard, "actions"
indisputably refers to legal proceedings instituted to vindicate a
claim or claims, _ and the phrase "under this subchapter" defines
the nature of the claims to be vindicated. So, the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the entire phrase "actions under this
subchapter" is legal proceedings to enforce the substantive
15A statute may reasonably be said to be infected with
ambiguity when its terms give rise to more than one meaning or
interpretation. See United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145
(4th Cir. 1994).
16The term "action" in its usual legal sense is "[a]n ordinary
proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress
or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public
offense." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY28 (6th ed. 1990).
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fights guaranteed by the subchapter, which in this instance are
the fights to be free from employment discrimination and
retaliation based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin) 7 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. Given
this, the statutory grant of jurisdiction to federal courts extends
only to actions to vindicate these substantive fights, and only
ancillary to such actions may federal courts discretionarily award
fees and costs to the prevailing party. See § 2000e-5(k); cf.
White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 455
U.S. 445, 451-52, 71 L. Ed. 2d 325, 102 S. Ct. 1162 (1982)
(finding that a request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 "raises legal issues collateral to the main cause of action").
Thus, the jurisdictional grant in § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not extend
to an independent action solely for attorney's fees and costs
incurred in pursuing a claim for employment discrimination in an
administrative forum.
Although the statute's plain meaning points persuasively to
this conclusion, the analysis cannot end here, as Chris argues for
an alternative reading of the jurisdictional grant. In essence, she
argues that the ancillary power of a court to award fees and
costs found in § 2000e-5(k) is an independent remedy for which
an "action" may be brought under § 2000e-5(f)(3). This reading
of the statute is unpersuasive; it runs counter to the plain
meaning of the statutory language, and moreover, does not
serve well the statutory purpose of reducing unnecessary
17This analysis is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's
analysis of the jurisdictional requirement of § 2000e-5(f)(3).
See EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir.
1984) (ffinding jurisdiction for an action by the EEOC to enforce
a pre-determination settlement agreement because it was one
"brought directly under Title VII").
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litigation. IS
PerhaPs the most telling clue to the meaning of a putatively
ambiguous statutory term is the meaning accorded that term
elsewhere in the statute. This follows from the "well-established
canon of statutory construction that words have the same
meaning throughout a given statute." Baggett v. First National
Bank of Gainsville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1350 (1 lth Cir. 1997). This
principle, applied here, supports the statute's plain meaning as
granting jurisdiction only to actions to enforce the substantive
rights guaranteed under Title VII and to adjudicate fee disputes
only ancillary to such actions. Thus, each time the term "action"
(or "actions") appears in Title VII it refers to, or is entirely
consistent with, a court proceeding to prevent or remedy an
unlawful employment practice) 9 In other words, the statute
_gSeeinfra text accompanying notes 22-27.
19The words "action" and "actions" are used over forty
times throughout the statute. The most frequent use of the terms
is found within § 2000e-5, which contains not only the general
jurisdictional grant, but also the attorney's fee provision. Two
illustrative references, supportive of the result reached here, are
§ 2000e-5(h) which is titled "Provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 29
not applicable to civil actions for prevention of unlawful
practices" and states in the subsection text only that Chapter 6
shall not apply to "civil actions brought under this section";
and, § 2000e-5(f)(3) which authorizes venue for the "actions
under this subchapter" (1) where the unlawful employment
practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) where the
relevant employment records have been maintained; (3) where
the aggrieved party would have worked absent the alleged
unlawfial employment practices; and if the respondent is not
(continued...)
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consistently uses the terms "action" or "actions" to refer to suits
to enforce substantive rights. Not once is "action" used in the
statute to refer to a suit solely for collateral or ancillary relief.2°
Indeed, to adopt the construction of § 2000e-5(0(3 ) Chris
advocates would lead to anomalous results unlikely to have been
intended by Congress. For example, after the "action[] under
this subchapter" is brought in federal court, it becomes the duty
&the chiefjudge to designate "immediately" a judge to hear the
case, and then that judge must set the case for hearing "at the
earliest practicable date and [] cause the case to be in every way
expedited." § 2000e-5(0(4 )- (0(5). While these requirements
are both sensible and understandable in connection with claims
of employment discrimination or retaliation, they seem
incongruous, if not inappropriate, when applied to an action
19(... continued)
found in any of these places then (4) where respondent has its
principal office (emphasis added).
2°In the two specific instances where the statute permits a
federal court action for remedial measures to enforce the
substantive rights of Title VII, Congress separately granted
jurisdiction over such actions. This is persuasive evidence that
Congress did not intend to include actions &this nature in the
general jurisdictional grant found in § 2000e-5(f)(3). See §
2000e-8(c) (granting an employer permission to bring a "civil
action" in a district court for relief from an EEOC order or
regulation and granting district courts "jurisdiction" to issue an
order requiring compliance); and § 2000e-5(t0(2 ) (permitting the
EEOC to "bring an action" for temporary relief pending the
resolution era charge that has not been resolved by conciliation
agreement if the EEOC decides judiciai "action" is necessary "to
carry out the purposes of the Act").
A29
solely for attorney's fees. It is doubtful that Congress intended
to order expedition of claims brought solely to recover
attorney's fees. 21 In sum, the putative ambiguity resulting from
Chris' proposed construction of the phrase "actions under this
subchapter" is properly resolved in favor of a construction that
excludes an independent federal court action solely for
attorney's fees. Importantly, this conclusion is entirely
consistent with both Title VII's overall purpose, 22 and, more
specifically, with § 2000e-5(k)'s two-fold purpose: 2_ (1) to
21Indeed, in practice fees and costs are often not awarded
in Title VII cases until after disposition of the appeal unless
specific interim relief is warranted. See White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454, 102
S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) (acknowledging that district
courts have the freedom to establish timeliness standards for
hearing and deciding attorney's fee claims).
22Title VII's overall purpose is "to assure equality of
employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and
devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. I011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974).
23This purpose may, with caution, be gleaned from §
2000e-5(k)'s "sparse" legislative history. See Carey, 447 U.S. at
63. Caution is required because legislators' statements
concerning statutory purpose are not invariably accurate; such
statements may reflect only a minority legislative view or an
effort to influence anticipated litigation over an ambiguity
deliberately left in the statute. See United States v. Charleston
County SchoolDistrict, 960 F.2d 1227, 1233 (4th Cir. 1992).
(continued...)
A30
"make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious suit, ''24 and (2) to deter burdensome and frivolous
lawsuits by allowing a "prevailingparty" -- plaintiff or defendant
-- to obtain attorney's fees) s Further, the statutory scheme,
including the creation of the EEOC, together with the
requirement of deferrals to qualified state agencies reflect
Congress' intent to use administrative conciliation as the
primary means of handling claims. 26 What is central to the
statute's scheme and purposes is a prevailing party's right to
claim fees and costs in some forum. The result reached here
does precisely this; it preserves a prevailing party's.right to claim
fees and costs solely in the administrative forum where the
substantive claim is settled in that forum. In other words, the
result reached here gives a prevailing party one, but not two,
bites at the fees and costs apple. 27 In so doing, it succeeds in
23(...continued)
In short, the statute itself is the best evidence of purpose.
241d.(quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Hubert Humphrey)).
25See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 420, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (quoting
Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
26Alexander,415 U.S. at 44.
27Thisis true for both public sector and private sector Title
VII clairnants. Public sector claimants, like Chris, are statutorily
required to exhaust remedies at the EEOC, which in this
context, is empowered to grant the full range of Title VII
remedies, including an award of fees and costs. See §
(continued...)
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making it "easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious" discrimination claim; it also serves to deter the
assertion of frivolous cases; and importantly, it ensures that the
fees and costs tail does not ultimately wag the Title VII dog.
See Hensley v. Eekerhart, 461 U.S 424, 437, 103 SCt. 1933,
76 LEd2d 40 (1983) (noting that even an attorney's fee request
properly sought ancillary to a discrimination claim in federal
court "should not result in a second major litigation").
Chris, relying on dicta in the Supreme Court's opinion in
27(...continued)
2000e-16(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1); West v.
Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 119 SCt. 1906, 144 L.Ed.2d 196 (1999)
(holding that the EEOC has the authority under Title VII to
award compensatory damages to public sector claimants,
thereby making the EEOC a one-stop remedy center). Private
sector claimants must also exhaust their remedies at the EEOC
and, if appropriate, with a qualified state deferral agency. See
§ 2000e-5(c), (f); see also Tinsley v. First Union National
Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 442 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding the Virginia
Council on Human Rights a qualified deferral agency under Title
VII). But in this instance, the EEOC and many (though not all)
state deferral agencies have no remedial power and the principal
focus is on achieving a settlement through conciliation. In this
context, claimants are oftenpro se and the issue of fees does not
arise. Where a private sector claimant is represented and
chooses to accept a settlement at the administrative level, then
the issue of fees may be addressed in the settlement, should the
parties choose to do so. Of course if a respondent refuses to
address fees in the settlement, a private sector claimant may also
choose to reject any settlement and, with a "right to sue" letter
in hand, file suit in federal court and seek the full range of Title
VII remedies and fees and costs. See § 2000e-5(f),(g),(k).
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Carey, argues unpersuasively that Title VII's policy and purpose
lead to a contrary result. To be sure, a footnote • in Carey
reflects a concern that "anomalous" results would follow from
a rule allowing fee claims to be adjudicated in federal court only
when ancillary to a filed Title VII claim. 447 U.S. at 65-66 n.6,
100 SCt. 2024. Specifically, the footnote expresses the concern
that such a rule would "ensure that almost all Title VII
complainants would abandon state proceedings as soon as
possible," and that this would "undermine Congress' intent to
encourage ffialluse of state remedies." Id. Chris' reliance on this
dictum is unwarranted given that the Supreme Court later
reconsidered this policy concern, found it to have been
"exaggerated," and ultimately rejected it in favor of more
•persuasive policy arguments. See North Carolina Department
of Transportationv. CrestStreetCommunity Council, Inc., 479
U.S. 6, 13-14, 107 S.Ct. 336, 93 L.Ed.2d 188 (1986).
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Crest Street reasoned that
"'competent counsel will be motivated by the interests of the
client to pursue ... administrative remedies when they are
available and counsel believes that they may prove successful.'"
479 U.S. at 14-15 (citing Webb v. Dyer County Board of
Education, 471 U.S. 234, 241 n. 15, 85 L. Ed. 2d 233, 105 S.
Ct. 1923 (1985)). And, the Supreme Court also noted that in
any event, an interpretation of a statute could not be based on
a fear that an attorney would circumvent a potential remedy for
his client simply because it did not authorize attorney's fees. Id.
In addition, the Supreme Court stated that requiring the
underlying action to be filed in federal court creates incentives
for defendants to settle claims "expeditiously" rather than be
subject to attorney's fees for prolonged litigation in federal
court. 479 U.S. at 15. Perhaps most instructive was the
Supreme Court's finding that, under § 1988, the statute at issue
in that case, the award of attorney's fees "depends not only on
the results obtained, but also on what actions were needed to
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achieve those results," and that "it is entirely reasonable to limit
the award of attorney's fees to those parties who, in order to
obtain relief, found it necessary to file a complaint in court." ld.
at 14, 107 S.Ct. 336) 8
While there is no controlling Supreme Court or circuit
precedent resolving the jurisdiction question presented,
analogous authority supports the conclusion reached here. The
most apt Supreme Court precedent is Crest Street, a decision
interpreting language in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that is virtually identical to the
language in § 2000e-5(k). 29 479 U.S. 6, 107 S.Ct. 336, 93
L.Ed.2d 188. In Crest Street, an action brought solely to
recover attorney's fees, the plaintiffsought the fees as a result of
a motion to intervene irt a separate action in federal district court
that itself did not involve violations of any civil rights laws. ld.
at 10, 107 S.Ct. 336. Although the action in which the plaintiff
sought to intervene did not include allegations of civil rights
28Further,the Supreme Court stated that it cannot "ignore
the plain language of a statute" simply to avoid an "anomalous
result" because "'the short answer is that Congress did not write
the statute that way.'" Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 14 (quoting
Garcia v. UnitedStates, 469 U.S. 70, 79, 83 L. Ed. 2d 472, 105
S. Ct. 479 (1984) in turn quotingRussello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983)).
29Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of...
[T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [and other
specified civil rights statutes] the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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violations, plaintiffs proposed complaint on intervention alleged
violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The
district court, without resolving the intervention motion,
dismissed the plaintiffs proposed complaint after the original
parties reached a settlement. Id. Relying on the Title VI claims
in its proposed complaint, the plaintiff then filed a separate
action in federal district court solely to recover attorney's fees
under § 1988(b). ld. at 10-11, 107 S.Ct. 336. The Supreme
Court held that because the action for attorney's fees was not
itself an action to enforce any of the civil rights laws under Title
VI, the plain language of § 1988(b) did not authorize a federal
court to entertain a claim solely for attorney's fees. ld. at 12. For
the same reason, the same result should obtain here. Because the
instant action is not one to enforce the substantive rights
guaranteed under Title VII, then it follows that § 2000e-5(k),
like its virtually identical twin, § 1988(b), does not support an
independent federal action to adjudicate an attorney's fees
claim? °
3°The difference in language between the two sections
consists of the phrase any action "to enforce a provision of
[Title VI]" versus the phrase any action "under [Title VIII." The
insignificance of this difference is underscored by the frequency
and consistency with which courts have recognized that the two
provisions are identical. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U.S 754, 758, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 LEd.2d 670 (1980) (noting
that § 1988 was patterned aiter § 2000e-5(k)); Martin v.
CamalierHotelCorp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1359 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the "standard for awarding attorney's fees under §
1988 is identical to that under Title VII"); see also Hensley, 461
US. at 433 n.7 (same) (citing S. Rep. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US. Code Cong. & Admin.
(continued...)
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This application of Crest Street to § 2000e-5(k) has been
adopted by two unpublished district court decisions. 3_ In Ball
v. AbbottAdvertising,Inc., state agency proceedings resulted in
a finding of employer liability for.sex discrimination, following
which the "prevailing party" filed an action in federal court for
attorney's fees. The district court granted summary judgment for
30(...continued)
News 5908, 5912). In addition, courts also recognize that the
purpose of § 1988 is virtually identical to the purpose of §
2000e-5(k). See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 473 U.S. 1315,
1319, 87 L. Ed. 2d 683, 106 S. Ct. 5 (1985).
3_Other courts discussing, but not squarely deciding the
issue, are divided. Compare Slade v. United States Postal
Service, 952 F.2d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
decision in CrestStreetis not dispositive of § 2000e-5(k) claims
because § (k) has no requirement that the federal court action be
brought to enforce Title VII), and Duane M. v. Orleans Parish
SchoolBoard, 861 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
identical language of the attorney's fee provision of the
Education of the Handicapped Act permits an independent
action when the complaint has been settled at the administrative
level), with Keesee v. Orr, 816 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1987)
(stating that a federal court "has no jurisdiction to hear ancillary
claims [for attorney's fees] when there is no Title VII action
properly before the court"), and Paz v. Long lsland Railroad
Co., 954 F. Supp. 62, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting "[c]ommon
sense thus dictates that the reference to actions or proceedings
'under this [subchapter]' in § 2000e-5(k) necessa, ily refers to
lawsuits or administrative proceedings alleging discrimination or
retaliation in violation of Title VII"),affd 128 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
1997).
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the employer finding the holding of Crest Street dispositive of
§ 2000e-5(k) claims. 32 Similarly, in Alexander v. Stone, the
district court dismissed an action under Title VII solely for
attorney's fees brought by a civilianemployee of the Department
of the Army, and reiterated its reliance on Crest Street and the
plain language of § 2000e-5(k) in denying reconsideration of the
dismissal. See No. 91-2685, at 3-4 (D.N.J. May 1, 1992)
(unpublished disposition). 33
Chris relies almost exclusively on Jones v. American State
Bank, the only circuit court decision addressing and deciding the
question presented here. 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988). There,
the Eighth Circuit relied chiefly on "policy arguments" found in
the Supreme Court's decision in Carey and "themes which
pervade Title VII interpretation" to find federal jurisdiction over
an independent fee claim resulting from state administrative
resolution of a discrimination claim. See 857 F.2d at 498.
a2The district court's analysis is recounted in the Sixth
Circuit's decision. See Ball v. AbbottAdvertising, lnc., 864 F.2d
419, 420 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
33Both of these decisions were appealed, but the respective
circuits did not have occasion to address the jurisdiction issue.
In Ball, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the attorney's fee action, but found it unnecessary to decide
the applicability of Crest Street to Title VII actions because it
found the case was barred by the statute of limitations. 864
F.2d at 420. And, in Alexander, apparently while the case was
on appeal to the Third Circuit, the parties reached a settlement
that included an agreement to vacate the district court's opinion.
See Michael J. Davidson, Crest: dudicial Preclusion of an
Independent Suit Solely for Attorneys' Fees Under Title VII?,
18 Del. J. Corp. L 425, 441-43 (1993).
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Notably, the Supreme Court, since Carey, has disavowed certain
of these policy arguments, particularly the suggestion that
prohibiting an independent adjudication of attorney's fees would
discourage victims from seeking relief or cause them to settle
quickly on the employer's terms. See Crest Street, 479 U.S. at
13-15, 107 S.Ct. 336. No mention of this important point is
found in Jones. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on
Carey in this regard is unwarranted and unpersuasive. Also
unpersuasive is the Eighth Circuit's single sentence, footnote
dismissal of the relevance of Crest Street. Specifically, the
Eighth Circuit simply noted, without discussion, that the
mandatory administrative deferral system of Title VII rendered
Crest Street inapplicable to § 2000e-5(k)) 4 Id. at 499 n.10.
Although claims governed by § 1988 are not subject to Title
VII's administrative exhaustion requirements, this distinction is
irrelevant to the statutory jurisdictional analysis. Crest Street
reflects this point; there, the Supreme Court conducted
essentially the same sort of statutory analysis performed here
and in the course of doing so, found it unnecessary to mention
or discuss the absence of such mandatory exhaustion
34Title VII's deferral system requires that an aggrieved
party pursue allegations of unlawful employment practices
exclusively with a qualified state or local administrative agency
for sixty days before that party is permitted to file a charge with
the EEOC. See § 2000e-5(c). Such a charge filed with a state or
local agency is pursued under state or local law and is subject to
the remedies and relief permitted therein. See id; 29 C.F.R. §
1601.13(a)(3)(ii). After the sixty days, a Title VII complainant
may pursue the charge with the EEOC and, aider waiting a
minimum of 180 days, may file an action in federal court. See
generally § 2000e-5.
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requirements. 35 Moreover, there is no reason in principle to
predicate jurisdiction for an action solely for attorney's fees on
Title VIFs administrative exhaustion requirement given that after
240 days, a Title VII claimant, like the § 1988 claimant, is no
longer barred fiom bringing the underlying discrimination action
in federal court. See Carey_ 447 US. at 66 n.6. (stating that
after waiting 240 days, a Title VII complainant "appears to have
an absolute right to resort to an action in federal court"). For
these reasons, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Jones is
unpersuasive here.
In summary, § 2000e-5(k)'s plain language, specific and
overall purpose point persuasively to the conclusion that Title
VII by its terms does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear an independent claim for attorney's fees following
settlement of the substantive claims at the administrative level.
This result does not entail unfairness to this or other prevailing
parties as such parties would deafly have the one bite of the
apple that congress intended.
Accordingly, the Agency's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
is granted.
An appropriate Order will issue.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion to all counsel of record.
35SeeMarjorie A. Silver, Evening the Odds." The Case for
Attorneys'Fee Awardsfor AdministrativeResolution of Title V1
and Title V11Disputes, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 379, 416-19 (1989).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Civil Action No. 99-494-A
KELLY JEAN CHRIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion
to Dismiss pursuant.to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying
memorandum opinion, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
The clerk is directed to place this matter in the ended
cases.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to
counsel of record.
/s/
T.S. Ellis, III
United States District Judge
Alexandria, Virginia
July 28, 1999
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
Civil Action No. 99-1231-A
KELLY JEAN CHRIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Defendant.
AMENDED ORDER 1
The matter came before the Court on defendant's motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R.Civ. P.
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion,
Chris v. Tenet, _ F.Supp.2d_, 1999 WL 556740 (E.D. Va. Jul.
28, 1999), the motion is hereby GRANTED. Because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the Court, oral arguments in this matter would not aid
the decisional process, and hence will not be necessary.
1This order supersedes the order of the Court in this
matter dated September 13, 1999 and is necessary because the
September 13, 1999 order contained a typographical error
indicating that the motion was denied when, in fact, it was
granted.
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As this order disposes of all of plaintiff's claims, this
matter shall be placed among the ended causes.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all
counsel of record.
/s/
T.S. Ellis, III
United States District Judge
Alexandria, Virginia
September 15, 1999
